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Why would importing countries  apparently willingly choose
forms of protection  that are generally  thought  to result in large
transfers  to foreigners?  Perhaps  because  their share  of rents  -
and  the consequent  harm  to developing  countries  from the MFA
- may be greate: than has been assumed.
Policy  Research  WorkingPapers  disseminate  the  rindings  of  work  in  progress  and  encourage  the  exchange  of ideas  among  Bank  staff  and
aD  orherainterested  in  developrcntissu  Thesepapers,  distributedby  theResearchAdvisory  StaC.  carry  thenamesof  the  authors,reflect
onlytheirviews,andshouldbeusedand  citedaccordingly.The  -ndings,interpretations,and  conclusionsaretheautho  s'own.They  should
















































































































dPollcy  Research| V
Internallonal  Tradel
WPS 1003
This paper-a  product of the International Trade Division, International Economics Department-is  part
of a larger effort in the department to analyze the effects of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement on developing
countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project "License
Prices and Rent Sharing in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement" (RPO 676-69). Copies of this paper are available
free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Maria Teresa
Sanchez, room S7-025, extension 33731 (October 1992, 32 pages).
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) restricts  and assess its implications for the returns to
the access of developing country exporters to  Hong Kong producers.
developed country markets. It is usually assumed
that the exporting countries receive all of the  Their results suggest that rent sharing is an
economic rents that result from these import  extremely important feature of the market for
restrictions - making it unclear whether the  apparel exports from Hong Kong. U.S. importers
developing countries gain or lose as a result of  were estimated to receive rents that were about
the MFA.  62 percent of the landed price of the imports.
Recent theoretical work on trade policy  Krishna and Tan conclude that the total
under imperfect competition casts doubt on  potential rents arising from the MFA were split
whether exporting countries receive all of the  unevenly between the United States and Hong
quota rents arising from "voluntary export  Kong - with the U.S. share ranging from 47
restraints" such as those applied by the MFA.  percent for skirts to 94 percent for playsuits.
Drawing on this theoretical literature, Erzan,
Krishna, and Tan (1991) tested and rejected the  If the results of this study are corroborated
hypothesis that MFA quota rents on exports from  for other developing countries, the implications
Hong Kong to the United States accrued in full  of the MFA for developing countries are consid-
to the Hong Kong exporters. The results in this  erably worse than has typically been assumed.
paper build on that hypothesis-testing analysis
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The MFA, or Multi-Fibre Arrangement, is among  the most important  non-tariff
trade  barriers  facing  developing  countries  today.  Established  in  order  to
"achieve  the expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers to such  trade and  the
progressive liberalization of world trade in  textile products, while at the same
time ensuring the orderly and equitable development of this trade and avoidance
of disruptive effects in  individual  markets and  on individual  lines of  production
in  both importing and exporting countries,"'  it in fact sanctions a structure of
country-  and  product-specific  quotas  on  apparel  and  textiles  exported  by
developing countries  to  developed countries.  Far from  furthering  the economic and
social development of developing countries, the MFA is a major stumbling block
on their route to industrialization. 2 Standard paradigms of economic deveTopment
have countries going through phases of industrialization starting from light
manufactures such as textiles and apparel and graduating to more capital and
skill intensive industries such as iron  and steel.  By cutting off access  to their
major export  n,arkets  for  textiles and  apparel,  the MFA effectively short  circuits
the  industrialization process  for many  developing countries at a very early
stage.
The MFA has its origins in the voluntary export restraint (VER)  on cotton
textile products that the United States negotiated with Japan in 1957. This VER
succeeded in curbing Japanese cotton goods exports, but its side-effect was a
huge increase in  United States imports  from  new entrants to  the industry, notably
Hong Kong, Portugal, Egypt, and India. In its quest for a more comprehensive
solution to control cotton imports, the United States initiated multilateral
discussions, held under the auspices of the GATT, which eventually led to the
Short Term Cotton Textile Arrangement  (STA). The STA was in operation for one
year, starting from 1961. It  was succeeded  by the  Long Term  Arrangement on Cotton
Textiles (LTA)  in 1962.3  The LTA worked well in restricting the supply of cotton
textile exports to the United States, but its  side effect in  turn  was an increase
in US  imports of man-made  fiber textiles and apparel. The United States then
sought  to extend the LTA framework  to include  wool and  man-made fiber  textile and
apparel products, and thus the MFA was born.2
Since its inception in 1973, the MFA has been through  four successive
negotiations,  with  each  round  encompassing  a  wider  range  of  products  and
countries. By the end of the second MFA round, the United States had succeeded
in bringing more than 80 per cent of its total imports of textile and apparel
products  under  restraint  by  negotiating  bilateral  agreements  with  twenty
supplying countries  and  agreements  with  consultative  mechanisms  with eleven  other
countries.  Subsequent negotiations widened  country  coverage to  include many
emerging suppliers such as Bangladesh and the Maldives. In the third MFA round,
the United States also extended its fiber coverage to include silk blends and
other vegetable  fibers. The United States currently has some 147  individual
textile and  apparel categories  under restraint,  some  of which are further  divided
into  subcategories.  There are  presently  nine  developed  countries  and  thirty-three
developing countries participating in the MFA. 4
The MFA has been  widely studied and much attention has been devoted to its
welfare ccnsequences.5  For example, Morkre  (1984) estimates that United States
clothing import quotas on Hong Kong in 1980  spawned quota rents of $218  million,
or 23 per cent of the total value of clothing imports from Hong Kong; Hamilton
(1986)  calculates  the import  tariff equivalent rate  of  textile and apparel  quotas
on Hong Kong to be 9 per cent in 1981 and 37 per cent in 1982; and Trela and
Whalley  (1988, 1990) suggest global gains from the elimination of quotas and
tariffs of more than $17  billion (of  which $11 billion  will accrue to developing
countries)  and gains to the United States from the removal of quotas of  $3
billion.
These estimates are  based on the presumption of perfect competition in  all
relevant markets.  In such models,  as is well  known, tariffs  and quotas  are
equivalent  and  license prices,  when  available,  equal  the  implicit  specific
tariff. The usual practice in these empirical  studies is to take the  import
license  price as a  measure of the wedge between import  price and unit cost in  the
exporting country. 6 The case of Hong Kong is the most frequently studied, one
reason being that Hong Kong quota prices are relatively easy to obtain, since
their quota licenses are traded on the open market. In studying other exporting3
countries, where quota prices are harder to come by, researchers often use Hong
Kong quota prices as proxies. 7
However, simply assuming the standard competitive model as the basis for
empirical analysis of  the MFA  may be a somewhat  cavalier  approach. The underlying
assumption in the standard competitive model is that both the demand and supply
sides  of the  product market are competitive and, in  addition, license holders  act
competitively and are willing and able to sell at the price that clears the
license market. A host of possible alternatives to the competitive paradigm is
possible, and many of these have  not been analyzed. If imperfections exist, then
institutional details such as the quota implementation procedure and license
allocation  mechanism  in  the  exporting  country  become  more  important
considerations. If  market imperfections  result in  rent sharing,  as we  argue here,
existing estimates of the effects of liberalization will change dramatically.
The assumption of competitive markets in the study of the MFA is usually
defended on the grounds that there are a large  number of producers i.-i  the  textile
and apparel market. In the case of some advanced exporters, notably Hong Kong,
further justification is provided by the fact that the quotas are efficiently
implemented and are, to a large extent, transferable. However, while it seems
reasonable to assume that Hong Kong producers are competitive, it is not clear
that  market power does not  exist in  the market for  quota licenses and on the side
of  the US purchasers. For example, the 1988 numbers equivalent of the Herfindahl
index of concentration in license holding was 3.95 for MFA category 340 (men's
and boys cotton  woven shirts), and 5.49  for  MFA category 434 (men'  s  woollen coats
and jackets).  The five-firm  concentration ratio in  license  holdings for  these two
categories was 83 per cent. An editorial in the Hong Kong trade journal, Textile
Asia,  alleges that:  "Quota price fluctuations do not in fact reflect normal
supply and demand but the course of manipulation by the quota holders" 8 while
Goto  (1989, p.218) claims that: "Although governments of exporting countries'
under the MFA often allocate export licenses in a manner that helps exporters
capture the quota rent,  many of these  exporters face large importing enterprises
that can  negotiate prices  that capture some  of the rent for  themselves."  For the4
United States, Caves  and Rosen  (1982, p.l 6)  note that department  stores and
specialized apparel and accessory stores together account for the liorn  a chare
of total  sales in women's/girls'/infants  clothing, and that  "(due) to chai.n
organizations, both tnese store  types  exhibit some  concentration as buyers at  the
national level..."9
1.1. A Brief Theoretical Review
Figure 1  is  a  diagrammatic illustration  of the  competitive  model underlying
most empirical studies  of the MFA. In the figure,  the line  RD represents residual
demand from the United States. This is derived by subtracting US supply and
supply from sources  other than Hong Kong from  total demand in  the United States.
The line  RS depicts residual supply from  Hong Kong. This is supply from  Hong Kong
less demand from all sources other than the United States. In the absence of
quotas, the intersection of RD and RS gives the world price and the level of
ir:ports  from Hong Kong to the United States. If a quota is set allowing only V
units to be imported, the US price at which this level of imports is demanded
(Pus)  exceeds the Hong Kong price at which it is supplied (PH). The difference
gives the license price (L), or per unit quota rent.
Clearly, this results from this model are not necess:.ily applicable if
market imperfections exist.1 0 Let us refer to the difference between pus  and PHK
as the "potential  rent." Notice that in the competitive model, the license price
changes with the quota level so that  Pus  =  PHK  +  L  always. In other words, this
equality is unaffected by changes in the quota level, and the license price is
always equal to the potential rent. Now suppose there is competitive supply but
concentration in license holdings as well as market power on the buyer's side.
This seems like a fair assumption for the US-Hong Kong apparel trade situation,
judging from  the data, as well as from  existing descriptions in  Textile Asia and
other sources. In this case, there is bilateral monopoly power, and the issue
becomes  one  of  sharing  the  potential  quota  rent.  As  defined  earlier,  the
potential rent from a license is the difference between the supply price (PH)5
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and the demand price in the home market  (PUS).  If this rent is bargained over
and shared in some way between the Hong Kong license holders and the US
buyers, then the import price will lie somewhere between pus  and PH.  As a
consequence, (PHK  + L) falls short of pus,  that is, the license price is no
longer equal to the potential rent. In addition, the Hong Kong price inclusive
of the license price, can vary with the quota level, as well as the quota
utilization ratio and the concentration in license holdings.
1.2 Evidence of Rent Sharing in the MFA
Krishna, Erzan, and Tan (1991)  test for rent sharing using data from the
United St&tes and Hong Kong. Our approach there was not to point to and model
a particular form of market imperfection but instead to test if all the
implications of the standard competitive model were borne out in the data.
Simply put, if there is perfect competition everywhere, then the license price
inclusive Hong Kong price, adjusted for tariffs and transport costs, should be
equal to the domestic (US)  price of apparel. Other variables such as the quota
utilization ratio and the concentration in license holdings should have no
effect on this adjusted Hong Kong price.
We tested this hypothesis by regressing the adjusted Hong Kong price on
a constant, the United States price, the concentration in license holdings,
the quota size, and the quota utilization ratio. We found that we could
strongly reject the null hypothesis. Recognizing that our results could be due
to compositional differences in US production compared to Hong Kong exports,
we developed a way of testing for the existence of such differences. We did
not find these compositional differences to be significant on the whole. We
also attempted to incorporate some notion of product differentiation by
introducing quality differences as fixed effects in the regression. Still, we
found that this did not entirely account for the difference in the US and Hong
Kong prices.7
In this paper, we use an updated version of the Krishna, Erzan and Tan
(1991) data on US apparel imports from Hong Kong to provide sc.ne  estimates of
the extent to which quota rents are shared.
2. The Data
The data utilized in this study cover the time period 1981-88 and
pertain to three broad areas: domestically-produced apparel, imported apparel
from Hong Kong, and license holdings for apparel imports from Hong Kong. We
did not attempt to obtain data on all categories of apparel. There are severe
difficulties in
assembling a consistent panel of data due to the different and changing
classification systems used in reporting information on imports and domestic
production. Therefore, we chose groups of apparel such that these consistency
problems were minimized. Our objective was to get as many relatively
consistently-defined, disaggregated groups that we could find or develop
concordances between the different classification systems employed.
We identified ten such groups. They are: (1)  dresses; (2) skirts; (3)
playsuits;  (4)  sweaters; (5) trousers; (6) men's coats; (7)  women's coats; (8)
woven shirts; (9)  knit shirts; and (10) underwear. We obtained data for these
groups for the following variables between 1981 and 1988. In our notation, the
subscript i indexes the apparel group, and t indexes the year.
pius  Unit value of US production
p,tHK  C.i.f.  Hong Kong price. This includes the license price. We
shall refer to this license-price-inclusive Hong Kong price
as the adjusted Hong Kong price.
Qi,  iK  Imports from Hong Kong.
Hi,  :  Numbers equivalent of the Herfindahl index of concentration
in license holding.
VI,  :  Quota level for imports.
U;,  :  Utilization ratio of imports, where U;,  =  Qi,IK/V;,.8
The quantities are measured in pieces and the prices are in US dollars
per piece. The sources of these data and details on how they were created are
available from the authors on reque;.t.
3. Are Price Differences Wholly  ue to Quality Differences?
Krishna, Erzan, and Tan (1991)  established that there was a gap between
the US price of apparel and the license-inclusive Hong Kong price. We further
showed that this price differential did not seem to be the inadvertent result
of data aggregation.
Another obvious explanation for the price difference 'etween US and Hong
Kong produced apparel is that the quality of the two products is not the same.
For example, the price of US-made skirts may be higher than the price of
skirts imported from Hong Kong not because of rent sharing but because
domestically produced skirts are of a higher quality. Unfortunately, we did
not have measures of the quality of US apparel and the quality of Hong Kong
apparel so we could not include the quality difference as an independent
variable. However, we made the simplifying assumption that the US-Hong Kong
quality differential was fixed over time, although it could vary across
apparel group. Then we incorporated these fixed quality effects by introducing
them as apparel group specific dummy variables.
Our estimation procedure is related to the earlier regression in
Krishna, Erzan, and Tan (199i). In that regression, we ran tha adjusted Hong
Kong price on a constant, nine apparel group dummies, the US price, the quota
levei, the quota utilization ratio, and the numbers equivalent of the
Herfindahl index, which measures concentration in the license holdings and
proxies for market power in the license market:
,  =a+  a,D1  +  ...  +  .9D.  +  iP us  + yH1 c  +  WUit + TV1c9
However, the assumption that quality differentials are fixed effects is
admittedly a strong one. A common criticism of this approach is that it could
generate spurious correlations wince within-group variations in the US-Hong
Kong price difference will be picked up by any explanatory variable which
changes over time. Ideally, we would like to be  able to estimate a
simultaneous equation system based on Armington's (1969)  model, where products
are differentiated by their country of origin. Unfortunately data limitations
prevent us from doing so. We can, however, take a step towards addressing this
criticism by  introducing a time trend in our regression equation.
Let T,  represent a (linear)  time trend, with the T,  =  1, T2 =  2, ...  Ts  =
8. Our new regression equation is:
P  = al  +  aID, 4  +  9D9 +  pTt +  PPus  + yH1t  +  Wit +  Vit  (1)
The time trend allows some variation in the group intercepts over time,
although these year effects are assumed to be the same acroes apparel groups
for every year. This may or may not be a realistic assumption, but short of
introducing a dummy for every single observation, there is not much else we
can do." we continue to assume that the effect of a quality differential on
the price difference is additive, i.e., only the intercept is affected.
The right hand side variables in regression (1) can be considered as
exogenous variables. If the United States is a large country, pj 1 us  is properly
taken as given. As quota license allocations are historically determined, Hi,
can also be taken as given though it does vary over time with the composition
of exports. The quota level, VI,,  is exogeously determined. The utilization
rate, Ui,,  should be unity if the quota is binding, and any departure from
unity is assumed to reflect exogenous difficulties in attaining full
utilization due to frictions in the implementation system.
Our choice of right hand side variables is quite intuitive, although it
is not exhaustive." 2 We chose a linear specification because it lends itself
most easily to interpretation, as shown in the following paragraphs.' 310
If there is no rent sharing and there are no quality differences, then:
phHr = Pl,u. (Recall  that  P1j, includes  the  license  price.)  In other  words,  al,
... , Co  and p  should be zero and B should be unity. Moreover, none of the
other variables should enter significantly into the equation.
If there is no rent sharing but there are time-varying quality
differences of an additive form, that is if an American product is "worth" a
fixed number of dollars more (or less) than its counterpart imported from Hong
Kong, then we should observe, for the ith apparel group at time t: Pj,HK  = a,  +
pi,%,  where a,, iB  the intercept term for apparel group i at time t:
cc=  CZ  + ai  +  p Tt  for  i  = 1,...,9
10  ~  ~  ors1
= 10  + PTC  for  i  = 1 0
The intercept for each apparel group, aj,'  would give an estimate of the
quality difference in the products by country of origin at time t. The
coefficient on Pf,us  should still be unity and T,  6  and * should still be zero.
In other words, the null hypothesis is: Ho:  B =  1 and T  =  6  =  0  =  0  If the
null hypothesis is proven false, then we take the evidence to be suggestive of
the existence of rent sharing.
Rent sharing essentially means that the license price inclusive Hong
Kong price is lower than the US price. Now we can think of rent sharing as
consisting of two parts: an additive part and a multiplicative part. For
example, quota rent may make up a fixed amount plus a fraction of the US
price. The fixed amount then represents the fixed (or  additive) component of
rent sharing and the fraction represents the marginal (or  multiplicative)
component of rent sharing.
The results of regression (1)  are shown in Table 1. The adjusted R 2 is
quite high at 0.96, suggesting that our regression has captured most of the
relevant factors." 4 The estimate of B  is 0.38, and it is significantly less
than unity.  1 5 Furthermore, the null hypothesis that n  =  1 and T  =  6  =  =  011
can be rejected at the 1 per cent level. This seems to suggest that some form
of rent sharing exists. We can think of B as representing the marginal
component of rent sharing. A $1 increase in the US price is associated with an
$0.38 increase in the adjusted Hong Kong price, so that if our model is
correct, $0.62 of the marginal price differential or rent is retained in the
United States.' 612
Table  1:  Regression  Results
Dependent  variable  =  p1,HK
Independent
Variable  Coefficient  t  Statistic
Constant  2.9112  0.2898
(10.0446)
D,  8.4295  0.8620
(9.7795)
D 2 2.1302  0.2240
(-0.3960)
D 3 -3.6851  -0.3960
(9.3067)
D4  5.4033  0.7S32
(6.8987)
D,  3.5500  1.8767c
(1.8916)
D6  3.6596  0.3838
(9.5343)
D7  2.5788  0.2820
(9.1442)
Do  3.0167  1.1659
(2.5875)
1X9  5.5284  3.0983'
(  1.7844)
pi,  us  0.3761  2.3185b
(0.1622)
Hit  -0.0335  -1.4503d
(0.0231)
iT,,  0.5765  0.2315
(2.4903)
Vi,  -0.4697  x  10-7  -0.4619
(0.1017x 10-6)
T,  0.4655  3.9643
(0.1174)
R2  =  0.9653,  Adjusted  R2 =  0.9554
Number  of  observations  =  64
Standard  errors  are  in  brackets  beneath  the  estimates  of  the
parr2meters.  (These  standard  errors  do  not  differ  appreciably  from
those  obtained  with  the  White  correction,  therefore  we  discount
the  possibility  of  heteroscedasticity  in  our  sample.)
*:  Significant  at  the  1  per  cent  level.
b:  Significant  at  the  5  per  cent  level.
C:  Significant  at  the  10  per  cent  level.
d:  Significant  at  the  20  per  cent  level.
Results  of  hyvothesis-testinc:
t-statistic  for  test  of  Ho:  1=1 vs  i31:
T  = -3.8455  --  reject  the  null  hypothtais  at  the  1  per  cent  level.
F-statistic  for  test  of  Ho: 3=1,  T=6=0=0:
F  =  4.9560  --  reject  the  null  hypothesis  at  the  1  per  cent  level.13
4. Estimating the Extent of Rent Sharing
Note  from  Table  1 that  not only  is the  coefficient  on  the  US  price
significantly different from unity, but the coefficients on the other variables
are not all equal to zero. Therefore we cannot interpret the intercepts for  each
apparel group as their quality difference.' 7 Because the other variables, HI,,  Ul,,
and VI,  are  not zero,  their influence is  projected onto the intercept  term in (Pus,
PH¶  space. In other words, the relevant intercept for apparel group i at time
t in (pus,  PHK)  space is given by (au,  +  THi,  + 6Ui,  + oVi,).
Thus, in order to obtain an estimate of the quality difference, we must
adjust for this contamination. This can be done by removing the influence of V;,,
U,,  and Hh  on the intercept for each observation. The "adjusted intercept" for
each apparel group is thus given by A,,,  where:
Ai,  = ale  + yyH 1 - a8Ut 1 +  pVic.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 2. The fixed component
of rent sharing works to make A,  negative as it implies a lower adjusted Hong
Kong price than the US price, while higher Hong Kong quality works to make A 1
positive. Since most of the adjusted intercepts are positive, our work suggests
that  Hong  Kong  quality  exceeds  US  quality.1 8 It  is  impossible  for  us  to
distinguish between quality effects and the fixed component of rent sharing in
A..  For this reason, we  will only look at the  marginal component of rent sharing,
which implies that our estimates are under-estimates. As can be seen from Table
1, 1 is less than one, as a $1 increase in the US price is associated with a
$0.38 increase in the license-price-inclusive Hong Kong price. The amount of
marginal rent sharing equals the average US price multiplied by (1-B).
Figure  2  may  help  to  clarify  our  explanation.  It  is  drawn  for  a
representative apparel group i  at time t in (Pus,  pHK)  space. If there is no rent
sharing  and  there are  no quality  differences, the fitted line  from  regression (1)
should lie along the 45 degree line, and as none of the other variables matter,
this diagram captures all the relevant dimensions.14
Table 2:  Rent Sharing Estimates
Marginal Rent
Apparel  Adjusted  Sharing
Group  Year  Intercept  (in US$)
1. Dresses  1981  ...  ...
1982  ...
1983  11.33  9.79
1984  11.80  9.73
1985  12.27  10.36
1986  12.73  10.29
1987  13.20  12.04
1988  13.66  12.85
2. Skirts  1981
1982  ...
1983  5.22  7.74
1984  5.69  7.74
1985  6.15  7.49
1986  6.62  7.74
1987  7.08  8.05
1988  7.55  8.61
3. Playsuits  1981  ...  ...
1982  ...
1983  ...  ...
1984
1985  1.09  2.62
1986  1.56  2.56
1987  2.02  3.37
1988  2.49  3.37
4. Sweaters  1981  6.44  4.49
1982  6.90  4.62
1983  7.37  4.80
1984  7.83  4.99
1985  8.30  4.62
1986  8.76  5.18
1987  9.23  6.43
1988  9.69  6.30
5. Trousers  1981
1982
1983  3.35  5.80
1984  3.82  5.61
1985  4.29  5.74
1986  4.75  5.68
1987  5.22  5.80
1988  5.68  6.36:5
Table  2  (Contn'd.):  Rent  Sharing  Estimates
Marginal  Rent
Apparel  Adjusted  Sharing
Group  Year  Intercept  (in US$)
6. Men's  coats  1981  ...  ...
1982
1983  6.91  10.48
1984  7.37  10.67
1985  7.84  11.17
1986  8.30  11.35
1987  8.77  13.60
1988  9.23  14.47
7. Women's  Coats  1981  4.50  15.47
1982  4.97  15.35
1983  5.43  16.35
1984  5.90  17.34
1985  6.37  16.66
1986  6.83  17.03
1987  7.30  15.22
1988  7.76  15.85
8. Woven  Shirts  1981
1982  2.95  4.49
1983  3.41  4.99
1984  3.88  5.05
1985  4.34  5.05
1986  4.81  4.99
1987  5.28  5.30
1988  5.74  5.68
9. Knit  Shirts  1981  2.05  2.31
1982  2.52  2.31
1983  2.99  2.50
1984  3.45  2.43
1985  3.92  2.50
1986  4.38  2.37
1987  4.85  2.31
1988  5.31  2.37
1O.Underwear  1981  ...  ...
1982  ...  ...
1983
1984  -0.81  1.62
1985  -0.35  1.22
1986  0.12  0.87
1987  0.58  0.94
1988  1.05  0.87
n"...  nnot  available.16
If there is a time-varying quality difference only and this is additive,
then the fitted line for  time t should be represented by the 45 degree line  which
is displaced along the intercept  by the extent of  the quality difference. But its
slope should be unity, and  no other variable should matter. (The same applies in
the case of additive time-varying quality differences and fixed res;t  sharing.)
If the other variables like the quota size, the quota utilization ratio,
and the numbers equivalent do matter, then the fitted line, projected onto (PI,
PH) space, is displaced by the quality effects (and/or fixed rent sharing) and
the effects of the other  variables with non-zero coefficients at time t.  When the
effects of these other variables are removed, we obtain the line SS'. This goes
through S  which is above zero if  this apparel group has a higher quality in Hong
Kong  than  in the  United  States  in  that  year  (and no  fixed  rent  sharing).
Furthermore, the slope of SS' is less than unity, 0.38 in our case.
If we adjust for quality  (and/or fixed rent sharing), i.e., move SS, so
that  it goes  through the  origin, we  get  the line OS".  This  represents the
predicted Hong Kong price at any given US price after removing the effect of
quality differences at time t. The remaining difference in the US and Hong Kong
prices is due to marginal rent sharing.  Thus in  Figure 2, OS is the estimate of
quality differences and AB is due to marginal rent sharing, which equals (1-B)
times the United States price.
Table  2  also  gives  the  dollar  amount  of  marginal  rent  sharing.  Its
contribution relative to the US price is by assumption fixed at (1-B),  or 0.62,
across apparel groups.17
Figure  2:  Marginal  Rent  Sharing
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5. Estimating the US' Share of Potential Rent
To get a more accurate picture of rent sharing, we should focus on the
amount of  rent  obtained by  the United  States as  a proportion  of  the total
potential rent generated by the  MFA quotas rather than as a proportion of the US
price.  Recall  our definition  of the potential  rent which  is the  difference
between the demand price (i.e.,  the price in the United States) and the supply
price (i.e,  the Hong Kong price exclusive of the license price.) In the absence
of rent sharing, the license price exactly makes up the difference. However, if
rent sharing exists, then the license price falls short of the potential rent,
with the remainder going to the US importers. In  this section, we look  at how the
potential rent is divided between the Hong Kong exporters  (in the form of the
license price) and the US importers (in  the form of rent.)
As described in Morkre  (1979, 1984) and Krishna, Erzan, and Tan (1991),
quota licenses in  Hong Kong are transferable to a  certain extent. However, there
is no systematic record of the transactions and we owe a great deal to Carl
Hamilton at the University of Stockholm's Institute for International Economic
Studies and Peter Ngan of the Federation of Hong Kong Garment Manufacturers, who
provided us with  monthly  license prices  for many  MFA  categories  in several
years.1 9 In order to get an idea of the license price for each apparel group, we
had to aggregate our monthly license price data into the ten apparel groups and
then average them over time.0 As can be seen from Table 3, the average license
price ranges from $0.12 per piece for underwear to $9.10 per piece for skirts.
Table 3 also gives the potential rent for each apparel group in  each year,
with the potential rent  measured as license  price plus  marginal component of rent
sharing. The rent estimates are  obtained from Table 2.  As can be seen from  Table
3,  even if  we assign the adjusted intercepts  to represent  quality differences and
consider only the multiplicative component of rent sharing, then the US' share
of the total potential rent is very substantial, ranging from 47 per cent for
skirts in 1986 to 94 per cent for playsuits in 1988.19
Table 3:  Rent Sharing Estimates as Proportion of Potential Rent
License  Potential
Apparel  Price  Rent  Rent
Group  Year  (in  US$)  (in  US$)  Share
1. Dresses  1981  ...  ...  ...
1982
1983  4.01  13.80  0.710
1984  3.82  13.55  0.718
1985  1.42  11.78  0.879
1986  4.37  14.66  0.702
1987  3.41  15.45  0.779
1988  1.92  14.77  0.870
2. Skirte  1981  ...  ...  ...
1982  ...
1983  1.47  9.21  0.840
1984  1.12  8.86  0.874
1985  2.91  10.40  0.720
1986  8.54  16.28  0.475
1987  9.10  17.15  0.469
1988  3.91  12.52  0.688
3.  Playsuits  1981  ...  ...  ...
1982  ...  ...
1983  ...  ...  ...
1984  ...  ...  ...
1985  ...  ...
1986  0.23  2.79  0.917
1987  0.32  3.69  0.913
1988  0.23  3.60  0.936
4. Sweaters  1981
1982  1.98  6.60  0.700
1983  4.35  9.15  0.525
1984  1.98  6.97  0.716
1985  1.39  6.01  0.769
1986  2.63  7.81  0.663
1987  1.98  8.41  0.764
1988  1.30  7.60  0.829
5. Trousers  1981
1982  0.42  ...
1983  1.89  7.69  . 0.754
1984  1.86  7.47  0.751
1985  1.27  7.01  0.819
1986  1.72  1.40  0.767
1987  3.03  8.83  0.657
1988  1.94  8.30  0.76620
Table  3  (Contn'd):  Rent Sharing Estimates as Proportion of Potential Rent
License  Potential
Apparel  Price  Rent  Rent
Group  Year  (in  US$)  (in US$)  Share
6. Men's Coats  1981
1982  0.83
1983  1.56  12.04  0.870
1984  2.56  13.23  0.806
1985  1.58  12.75  0.876
1986  1.22  12.57  0.903
1987  2.80  16.40  0.829
1988  1.79  16.26  0.890
7. Women's  Coats  1981  ...
1982  1.81  17.16  0.895
1983  3.29  19.64  0.832
1984  2.51  19.85  0.874
1985  1.15  17.81  0.935
1986  1.64  18.67  0.912
1987  3.01  18.23  0.835
1988  1.81  17.66  0.897
8. Woven Shirts  1981
1982  0.36  4.85  0.926
1983  1.00  5.99  0.833
1984  1.72  6.77  0.746
1985  1.70  6.75  0.748
1986  1.42  6.41  0.779
1987  1.75  7.05  0.752
1988  0.88  6.56  0.866
9. Knit  Shirts  1981  ...
1982  0.53  2.84  0.813
1983  0.71  3.21  0.779
1984  0.95  3.38  0.719
1985  0.53  3.03  0.825
1986  1.57  3.94  0.602
1987  1.98  4.29  0.538
1988  0.91  3.28  0.723
lO.Underwear  1981  ...  ...  ...
1982  ...
1983  ...  ...  ...
1984  ...  ...  ...
1985  ...  ...
1986  ...  ...  ...
1987  ...  ...
1988  0.12  0.99  0.879
:  License price plus dollar amount of marginal rent sharing.
: Marginal rent sharing divided by potential rent.
".  : not  available.21
We  recognize that  our  estimates are  only rough  approximations; nonetheless,
they do cast doubt on the validity of the assumption that all the quota rent
accrues to the Hong Kong exporters in the form of license prices.
6. Conclusion
our main objective in this chapter was to estimate the degree of rent sharing
that occurs in the various apparel groups. Starting from the observation that
there is a non-trivial gap between United States price of apparel and the c.i.f.
Hong Kong price, inclusive of the license price, our first step was to find out
whether this  differential  could be wholly  explained by time-varying  quality
differences. We found that we could strongly reject this hypothesis, and other
variables like the quota size  (Vj,),  the quota utilization  rate  (UZ,),  and the
numbers equivalent of the Herfindahl index of concentration in license holding
(Hi,)  also played a part in explaining the US-Hong Kong price differential. We
concluded  that  there must  be  some  rent sharing  taking  place, that  is, U.S
importers seem to be capturing some of the quota rents.
We can think of rent sharing as being made up of a fixed component which
is  apparel group specific, and and a marginal component, (1-B)  which is  constant
for all apparel groups. The fixed component is hard to distinguish from quality
differences  in  the  apparel  groups,  so we  focused entirely  on  the  marginal
component. Our estimate of the amount of marginal rent sharing as a percentage
of the US price was approximately 62 per cent. To get a better picture of how
quota rents are distributed between the United States and Hong Kong, we also
calculated the amount of rent extracted by the United States as a proportion of
the total potential rent. We found that the potential rent was split unevenly
between the United States and Hong Kong, with the US' share ranging from 48 per
cent for skirts to 94 per cent for playsuits.
We reiterate that our estimates are only very rough calculations. Our
limited data  set prevents us  from undertaking any  sophisticated econometric
analysis, 2 1 and we were further disadvantaged by a complete lack of information
on some possibly key variables such as the degree of monopsony power on the side22
of the US importers. Notwithstanding these data problems, however, our results
do call into  question the validity of  the common assum,tion that there is  perfect
competition in the product and license markets under the MFA. It is  very likely
that the winners under the MFA are not only foreign license holders and domestic
apparel  producers, but  domestic importing firms  as  well. This further  strengthens
the domestic  lobby  for repeated extensions of the MFA,  to the detriment of
domestic consumers and foreign apparel suppliers. In fact, if rent sharing is a
valid  concern,  then  the  estimated  welfare  effects  of  dismantling  the  MFA
calculated by Trela and Whalley (1988,  1990)  may be off the mark, with the gains
being lower than estimated for the United States and higher than estimated for
the developing countries.
In the future,  we hope to  extend our  work in  two dirtctions. First,  we plan
to extend the scope of our study to include other developing countries in order
to provide further insights and to check the generality of our results. We will
then study  US apparel trade with non-r6stricted  countries as well to see if  price
differentials also exist that cannot be explained by quality differences --  if
so, then our inference of rent sharing under the MFA may be incorrect.23
END NOTES
'.  GATT (1974,  p.6.)
2.  See Faini, de Melo and Takacs (1992) for an analysis of the distortions
created by the MFA.
3.  The LTA was supposed to be in effect for five years starting from 1962,
but it was extended twice so that it lasted until 1973.
4.  For a comprehensive account of the history and workings of the MFA, see
Choi, Chung  and Marian  (1985), Keesing and Wolf  (1980), and  Hamilton
(1990), especially the chapter by V. Cable.
5.  See, for example, Hamilton (1990) which analyzes the effects of the MFA
and its proposed reforms from a variety of viewpoints.
6.  This is  the method used by Morkre (1984), for  example, as well as by Trela
and Whalley  (1988, 1990.)
7.  For example, Trela and Whalley (1988, 1990) compute the Hong Kong supply
price by subtracting the quota price from the US price. They then compute
the  production  costs of  quota  restricted  products  in other  exporting
countries by multiplying the unit cost in Hong Kong by the ratio of the
exporting  country's relative wage  in the  textile and apparel  industry
compared to Hong Kong.  It is worth pointing  out that  if rent sharing
exists, as defined in the text below, this procedure may not be correct.
8.  Textile Asia, March 1989.
9.  According to their 1972 figures, the  eight-firm national concentration was
51.4 per cerit  for departffent  'stores  'ancf  10.9 per cent for specialized
apparel  and  accessory  stores,  with  chains  of  eleven  or  more  units
accounting for 88.2 per cent of department store sales and 33.7 per cent
of apparel store sales.
10.  See Krishna (,992) for a detailed discussion.
11.  We tried using seven  year dummies instead of a time trend, but the results
were very similar.  Therefore, we felt  that the time trend was adequate for
our purposes. Besides, the year dummies used up more degrees of freedom.
12.  For  example,  some  measure  of  monopsony  power  on  the  part  of  the  US
importers and other cost factors associated with the quota system may be
included as independent variables. Unfortunately, as  is often the case
with empirical work, we were limited by the lack of data.
13.  See the appendix for an alternative specification.
14.  Of course, It  was not possible to contrcl for all possible factors, which
is why our regression does not fit perfectly.
15.  It is  possible that this low  B  estimate could be the result of measurement
error bias. This could arise if  our computed pi,US  values, after concordance
and aggregation, are only noisy proxies for their true values.24
16.  We experimented with several  different functional forms,  and found that we
could reject the null hypothesis always. The frequently-recommended  log
linear  functional  form,  for  example,  yielded  similar  results  in  our
hypothesis  testing  to  those  reported  in Table  1.  But  the  regression
coefficients in a log-linear equation are elasticities and as such, they
cannot be readily interpreted in terms of rent sharing.
17.  In fact, the intercepts ai,'  should be interpreted as the Hong Kong price
of group i at time t when its US price is zero and the quota size, the
quota utilization rate, and  the numbers equivalent are  also equal to zero.
By removing the "contamination",  we are in  effect finding the value of the
intercept at the existing values of Hi,,  Ui,  and V;,.
18.  We do not  find it implausible that Hong Kong quality  could exceed US
quality. The textile trade journals point out that Hong Kong is a source
of choice for high fashion items because of its  manufacturers' ability to
respond swiftly to design changes and to maintain quality  levels. For
example, an article in the July  1988 issue of Textile Asia points out
thet: "In the US, the trend is towards 'speed sourcing.' The supplier is
expected to fulfil an order  within a delivery period ranging from 30 to 45
days f.o.b. ...  The major advantage of Hong Kong over other manufacturing
centers is 'flexibility' ...  (i.e.] the ability to meet, and adapt to,
different kinds of buyer requirement. Such ability has been the result of
accumulation of manufacturing experience and  market knowledge, a flexible
industrial structure, an effic:ent material  supply network and  a well
developed infrastructure." (p. 96.) A report on quality in the September
1989  issue  of  Textile  Asia  contains  interviews  with  several
representatives of the Hong Kong apparel industry  (both the buying and
selling  side)  and  finds  that  "such  'plus'  factors  as  flexibility,
geographical  location  and  long  track  record  came  to  the  fore  as
representatives of industry  reviewed the quality situation." (p.  219.) The
interviewees described how  the Hong Kong apparel industry  had upgraded its
quality  in various  aspects. For example, there have  been considerable
improvements in the sewing equipment technology employed,  resulting in
fewer sewing defects.  There has also been  a greater  call  for product
testing services from local manufacturers --  as more and more Hong Kong
manufacturers  move  towards  the  high-value end  of  the  clothing  market
("premium goods"), they are increasingly taking steps to guarantee the
quality of their garments before shipment. This is  especially since "more
fashionable items (denote)  special quality consideration ... "  (p.  207) and
"(o]verseas buyers are more strict in the requirements for quality." (p.
211.) In fact, it is the trend among larger manufacturers in Hong Kong to
set up their own quality control unit, with an inspection team and in-
house laboratory for random checks on production. Neither is Hong Kong
inferior in terms of quality of design --  many international  designer
labels are represented on a franchise basis in Hong Kong, and this has had
a positive  spillover  effect  on  the  local producers  who  "become  more
exposed to a high level of quality, and try to match that level with their
own products."  (p.  206.) In general, the feeling in the industry is that
Hong Kong is  making better quality (and  more expensive) products and that
clothing importers are looking to the newer developing country suppliers
for cheaper merchandise. Hong Kong wages are significantly higher than in
most developing countries and as a result, its apparel industry has moved
out of the low end of the market.
19.  In addition, Textile Asia frequently tracks quota license prices.
20.  Again,  we  emphasize  that  our  calculations  are  necessarily  very
approximate. In particular, if there is  perfect competition in  the license
market,  the  monthly  license  price  has  two  components:  a  scarcity
component,  and  an  option  value  component.  (If  there  is  imperfect25
competition in the license market, then the license price could also be
subject to price fixing.) AB  quota allocations are valid only for one
calendar year, we would expect a license to have no value at the end of
the year.  Also,  a  quota  holder can  either use  his  license today  (by
shipping the goods himself or  making a  temporary transfer to someone  else)
or defer his license application in the hope of a higher price  in the
future if demand realizations are  high. Therefore, a license has an  option
value. This option value falls as the year proS:esses; consequently, we
would expect the license price to decline over the year on average. These
aspects of the license price path are missed in our averaging procedure.
21.  But even this small amount of data was not easy to come by.26
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APPENDIX:  THE "SERVICES" MODEL
It  has been pointed  out that US  goods  may have  quality characteristics that
make them intrinsically more valuable than Hong Kong goods. For example, suppose
Hong Kong apparel is e  per cent less  durable than US apparel. Then the purchaser
of Hong Kong apparel is really getting e  per cent less quantity, and the Hong
Kong good would be expected to sell at an 9 per cent discount, which would be
reflected  in B,  the  coefficient  on  pus in regression  (1). This  is a valid
concern, and we address it in this appendix.
Suppose  imports  from  Hong  Kong  are  of  a  different  quality  than
domestically-produced  clothing.  Following  Swan  (1970), we  can think  of  the
quality of a product as the amount of "services" obtained from its consumption.
These "services" are a homogeneous good with a  uniform price, s;,.  To the extent
that two products embody unequal amounts of "services", they will differ  in
quality and hence, in price. Let qjtus  denote the amount of "services" in  one unit
of  US-produced clothing i at  time t, and qmIK  the amount of "services" in  one unit
of Hong Kong-produced clothing i at time t.
In the above example,  the underlying assumption is  that q%,W  =  In  this
case, since  P"us  =  stqjus,  and  PitHK  =  si,%,K  =  escqus,  it follows that if PHHK and
Phus  are measured without error, we should observe:  pji =  OPitus.  This means that
the null hypotlhesis  in the following regression:
Pll"a  a+  *P*s  +  yH 1t  +  8U 1t  +  V  ,  (Al)
is  H.:  a  =  T  =  6  5  =  0, i.e., nothing else should matter aside from X, which
is the estimate of 9. Appendix Table 1 shows the results of regression (Al).
Clearly,  the  null  hypothesis  can  be  rejected  at  the  1 per  cent  level  of
significance. Note that this approach  assumes quality differentials are constant
across categories and over time.
We can also approach the issue in a more general manner. Let uft  and v.
denote random error terms. Then:  Pip,  =  sicl-P  + ui,,  and  P.,HK  s-  gqa  + v1t,  if28
the  errors  enter  additively;  and  p,us  =  qj1a1  usu 1i,  and  P,HK =  sqLmtHvh,  if  the
errors enter multiplicatively.
Appendix Table 1: Regression Results
Dependent variable = PhH
Independent
Variable  Coefficient'  t Statistic
Constant  -9.3454  -2.5411b
( 3.6778)
Pith  0.5469  9 . 5 9 2 2b
(0.0570)
Hit  0.0594  2.6222a
(0.0227)
T%t  13.1758  3.6543
( 3.6056)
V,t  -0.3511 x 10-7  -3.5643
(0.9852  x 10-8)
R2 =  0.8369,  Adjusted R2 =  0.8259
Number of observations =  64
:  Standard errors are in brackets beneath the estimates of the
parameters.
*.  Sigrificant at the I  per cent level.
b-  Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Results  of  hvyothesis-testina:
t-statistic for test of H0:  B=1 vs  13k1:
T =  -7.9474 --  reject the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent level.
F-statistic for test of H.:  a=T=6=0=0:
F =  15.8302 --  reject the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent level.29
Specification l  Additive errors
If  we assume random errors which enter additively into the formula, then:
pius  =  swqitus  + u1,,  and  Pit  =  sj,i, + v;,,  where  u;, and vi,  are  the  random  error
terms. Therefore:
P-  Pit  =  Sit  (  - qlt)  +  (vit  - ul.)
or:
Pi'  = P t  +  st  (qjt  - qut)  +  (it
where  ch  =  vi  - ui,;  ei,  satisfies the usual assumptions for a random error term.
Let Zt  denote the difference between the quality of Hong Kong clothing and US
clothing,  i.e.:  Zi,  = si,(qcH,  H  -jtus).
Since we have no way of measuring sit,  qcl,  , or qj,US,  we cannot hold quality
differences constant by including Z 1,  as an independent variable. However, we can
capture.Zi,  to  some  extent thrcough.the  use.of  apparel -jro'.,p  dummies and a time
trend. In other words, we assume that Zft  is a linear function of time:  Zh  =  Zi
+  uT,  for i =  1,  ... ,  10, and t =  1,  ... ,  8.  Of course, this entails the
assumption that the quality difference changes by the same  amount every year for
each  apparel  group,  but  in  the  absence  of  a  direct  measure  of  quality
differences, this is the best we can do.'  This is what we did in the paper.
Specification 2: multiplicative errors
If we assume the error terms enter multiplicatively, then:  PR'  =  Bhuu
and  Phk
1 = saq  v..  Taking logs, we have:
logPff  =  1og(s~it  )  - log(sitqjus)  +  logPif  +  (logv 1 ,  - logui.)
=  (log  j  - 1ogqu.)  + logPfe  + e!t
where  c  h  =  log Vht  - log ui,.30
Let Z% denote the log of Hong Kong quality relative to US quality, i.e.:
Z%  =  log ql,'  - log  -,us.  As before, assume Z% can be captured by apparel group
dummies and a time trend.
We ran the analog of equation (1)  using this new specification:
logP  =  40  - M.D1 +  - 49D9  + P*Tt  + plog10P  Y  +  + 8Ult  + vVit  + (it  (A2)
If there exist quality  (durability) differences but there is no rent sharing,
then we should expect IV  to be equal to 1 and  T  =  8=  5  =  0. If  there was only
marginal rent sharing, it would show up in the intercept as well, and n-  will
still equal 1. If there was both fixed as well as marginal rent sharing, then
this model would be misspecified, and running regression (A2)  could result in a'
k  1.
The results of regression (A2) are shown in Appendix Table 2. The joint
null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance. Thus,
it is not a misepecification of the error term that is causing us to reject the
competitive model.
The disadvantage of the log specification, however, is that it cannot be
used to draw any direct implications about rent sharing. The coefficient B'  in
the above equation now denotes the per cent increase in  the Hong Kong price which
accompanies a 1 per cent increase in the US price. From Appendix Table 2, this
number is 0.5252. However,  it is not clear how to  interpret this  since the
coefficient should be  unity even in  the  presence of marginal rent sharing alone.31
Appendix Table 2: Regression Results (Log Specification)
Dependent variable = log Pc,"
Independent
Variable  Coefficient*  t Statistic
Constant  -3.0220  -3.0604'
(0.9875)
DI  4.0859  3.7819'
(1.0804)
D 2 3.6568  3.5596'
(1.0273)
D3 2.9533  3.2192'
(0.9174)
D,  3.4134  4.4372'
(0.7694)
Ds  1.8526  3.9089'
(0.4740)
D6 3.7864  3.5601'
(1.0636)
)7  3.5857  3.3930'
(1.0568)
'-s  2.0749  4.4005'
(0.4715)
D9 1.3437  4.1556'
(0.3233)
log PithUs  0.5252  2.1647b
(0.2426)
Hi,  -0.4087 x 10-4  -0.0179
- ~(0.023)- 
*it  'O49  0.1798
(0.2499)
Vit  0.2049 x 10-7  2 . 0 768b
(0.9864  x 10-8)
T,  0.0399  3.2512a
(0.0123)
R=  =  0.9871,  Adjusted R2 = 0.9834
Number of observations = 64
':  Standard errors are in brackets beneath the estimates of the
parameters.
*:  Significant at the 1 per cent level.
b:  Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Results of hvyothesis-testingj:
t-statistic for test of HO:  1=1 vs Bk1:
T = -1.9570 --  reject the null hypothesis at the 10 per cent level.
F-statistic for test of H:  13=1,  T=6=0=0:
F =  3.4224 --  reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level.32
END NOTES FOR APPENDIX
1.  We can  use year dummies instead of a time trend. This is a slightly more
flexible  specification  as  it will  allow  the  year-to-year  changes  in
quality differences to vary with time. However, the results are not very
different from the simpler specification with a time trend.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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